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Monetary policy aspects of the enlarge-
ment of the euro area
• Accession of the candidate countries to the EU is to be followed by the introduc-
tion of the euro, although with some delay. This raises two fundamental questi-
ons. First, will the ECB, given its current decision-making procedures, be able to
adopt the needed monetary policy measures as swiftly as necessary? Second,
will structural inflation in the candidate countries cause serious problems for
monetary policy in the euro area?
• A reform of the ECB’s decision-making procedures is of utmost importance. In
order to function efficiently, the ECB’s decision-making body needs to be mana-
geable in terms of  size. Creating groups within which membership rotates seems
to be the best structure for an enlarged euro area.
• In answer to the second question,  structural features of  countries in the real
convergence process should not pose a serious problem for the monetary poli-
cy of the ECB. Firstly, due to their size and economic strength the candidate
countries will have an only minor weight  in the euro-area aggregate data. Se-
condly, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which is considered to be at work in coun-
tries in the process of catching up, will be only of small magnitude. Other fac-
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Monetary Policy Aspects of the
Enlargement of the Euro Area
At the Göteborg summit in June 2001, the EU
stressed its interest in concluding the accession
negotiations with the most advanced candidate
countries by the end of 2002. Their accession to the
EU would then be possible in 2004, enabling the
countries to take part in the elections to the Europe-
an Parliament due that year. The 2004 enlargement
could include up to ten countries.1
Entry to the EU implies membership in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union: the countries have to
regard their monetary and exchange rate policies as
a matter of common interest, and it is expected that
the new members will participate in the Exchange
Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). The central banks
must be independent of the governments; and in the
financing of budget deficits, governments must not
have recourse to central bank credits. However, the
introduction of the euro will not occur simultane-
ously with EU accession, as the Maastricht criteria
have to be met first. Because the new member states
are not granted an “opt-out” clause, their accession
to the euro area will take place automatically when
the convergence criteria laid out in the Maastricht
treaty are met. In any case, most candidate countries
aim for swift adoption of the euro (cf. Table 1).
Reform of voting rules
Currently the ECB’s Governing Council has 18
members with equal voting rights: the six members
of the Executive Board, and the twelve central bank
Table 1
Explicit goals for EMU participation and subsequent adoption of the euro
Euro target date ERM II participation
Cyprus 2005 with EU accession target of 1.1.2003 As of accession, maximum 2 years
Czech Republic – Standard fluctuation bands
Estonia – –
Hungary At the earliest possible date after accession 2 years, possibility of narrower than standard bands
Latvia – As of accession or later
Lithuania – –
Malta – As soon as possible after accession
Poland – After accession
Slovakia – After accession
Slovenia As soon as possible after accession, taking into Quick entry after accession
 account sustainable real convergence
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs:
Evaluation of the 2001 Pre-accesssion Economic Programmes of Candidate Countries.
Enlargement  Papers, No. 7, January 2002, p. 12. DIW Berlin 2002
presidents of the countries participating in the euro
area. According to the ECB Statutes, votes on mon-
etary policy require a simple majority. However, in
reality, decisions are usually adopted by consensus.2
In a stalemate case, the president casts the deciding
vote.
With the coming round of EU enlargement, the
Governing Council could have up to ten more mem-
bers as early as 2006. With the adoption of the euro
by the EU members Denmark, Sweden and the
United Kingdom as well as by the remaining candi-
date countries from Eastern Europe, the number of
persons entitled to vote would rise to as many as 33.
Under such circumstances, it seems neither practi-
cable nor appropriate to maintain the current voting
rules. Decision making would certainly become too
cumbersome. Furthermore, the already existing dis-
proportion between voting rights and the size of the
population as well as the economic might which
each vote ultimately represents will increase consid-
erably. In an extreme case, 17 central bank presi-
dents of smaller countries could determine the out-
come of a monetary-policy decision, although the
1 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2 This assessment is based on various remarks of Duisenberg in answer to
questions following press conferences. As an example, on 3 February 2000
he said: “First, there was no formal vote. Again, as I had hoped and as it
was, it was a consensus decision”. Another example dates from 8 June
2000: “We had an intensive discussion, a prolonged discussion, which was
very useful and, in the end, resulted in a consensus on what we had to do.”
Willem F. Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, ECB Press
Conference, Frankfurt a.M., 3 February 2000 and ECB Press Conference,





3 If the President had the right of initiative, the status quo could take a
dominant role. Cf. R.E. Baldwin, E. Berglof, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgren: Pre-
paring the ECB for enlargement, in: CEPR Policy Paper, No. 6/2001, p. 14.
4 “The proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential. The Governing
Council may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public.”
Art. 10.4 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
5 Cf. Baldwin et al., op. cit.
6 Baldwin et al. rightly emphasise this, cf. op. cit., p. 23.
7 Cf. E. Meade and N. Sheets: Regional Influences on U.S. Monetary Policy:
Some Implications for Europe, Discussion Paper No. 523/2002, Centre for
Economic Performance.
countries represent just 20% of the total population
and produce only about 15% of the euro-area GDP.3
Reducing the size of the Governing Council appears
unavoidable. This raises the question of whether
such a reduction can be reconciled with the interests
of the member states. It is obvious that the ECB can
target its monetary policy only at the euro area as a
whole, and regional interests should not play any
part in the decisions of a central bank. The central
bank presidents of each member country present in
the Governing Council are experts on monetary pol-
icy and required to exercise their task with a view to
the developments in the euro area as a whole. Given
their statutory independence, it is likely that deci-
sion-making processes within the council develop
their own internal dynamics. This does not, however,
preclude discussions of regional features and their
importance for the area as a whole; in fact, such dis-
cussions may be necessary to attain a complete pic-
ture of current economic and monetary develop-
ments. However, regional aspects cannot be the cen-
tral consideration in designing monetary policy
measures, unless they decisively affect developments
in the whole euro area. The independence of the mon-
etary policy decision makers is also supported by the
confidentiality of the minutes, as laid down in the
ECB’s Statutes.4 Ultimately, conflicts of interest
should arise only in the short term, if at all. A mone-
tary policy oriented towards the needs of Ireland, for
example, and thus taking a restrictive stance, would –
in the medium term – have to cope with the reces-
sionary tendencies this would trigger in the euro area
as a whole. Hence the principle must be: What is
good for the euro area is good for each country.
There are three possible reform models for the ECB
Council5: a monetary policy committee of experts
(as in the United Kingdom), groups that each
appoint a representative (as in the case of the IMF),
and rotation (as in the United States). The dilemma
in any reform model is that the tendency for indi-
vidual members to focus on national interests could
be aggravated if their representation were restricted.
At first glance, a monetary policy committee com-
prised of six to ten monetary policy experts seems to
be the best solution. Monetary policy requires experts
with experience, practical know-how and far-sight-
edness, and not representatives who pursue national
interests. However, a number of reasons could make
this option less desirable. First, central bank presi-
dents are usually qualified and experienced experts.
Second, as was already stressed, their knowledge of
regional developments contributes to a more com-
plete assessment of the developments in the euro
area. Third, as regards the accountability and credi-
bility of the ECB, the central bank presidents from
each individual country constitute the most important
links between the countries and the Governing Coun-
cil of the ECB.6 Fourth, it is difficult to imagine that
the election of monetary policy experts in the euro
area could take place without consideration of their
regional origin. The decision-making body of the
ECB differs in this regard from the Monetary Policy
Committee of the Bank of England or from that of
the Sveriges Riksbank, which were designed for sub-
stantially smaller and more homogeneous monetary
areas. Fifth, the experts in the monetary policy com-
mittee are not necessarily less attentive to regional
developments than the presidents of the national cen-
tral banks. A study of the voting behaviour in the Fed
has revealed that in the United States it is precisely
the members of the executive board who take into
account developments in their home regions.7
If groups of countries were to delegate representa-
tives to the Governing Council, all countries would
always be represented, and the decision-making
body would be of a manageable size. In such a case
one can assume that the representatives would have
to co-ordinate their positions with the other coun-
tries in their group, which restricts the independence
of their decision making. It therefore seems that the
already mentioned dilemma of a strong national
orientation of the Council’s members might be the
most severe in this option.
We therefore suggest that forming groups is com-
bined with rotation within each group. Rotation rath-
er than representation should reduce the danger of
national interests substantially influencing voting be-
haviour. The smaller countries of the euro area should
form groups that – insofar as practical – approximate-
ly correspond to each other in terms of economic im-
portance. Indicators used to determine the weight of
individual countries could be the size of population
and GDP with both indicators given equal weight.
Table 2 shows the proposed groups and the underly-
ing weights of the member countries in the enlarged
euro area. Restricting the total number of board
members to 19 and retaining the current structure of
an Executive Board of six members, then implies that
the central bank presidents of the seven largest coun-
tries – Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Spain, Poland and the Netherlands – would always
be present in the ECB’s Governing Council. The cen-
tral bank presidents of the other countries, most of
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Table 2
Proposed composition of the ECB Council
after a reform of voting rules
National central bank pre-
sidents representing countries Weight in %
2
or groups of countries
1
   1 Germany 20.6
   2 United Kingdom 15.4
   3 France 14.7
   4 Italy 13.1
   5 Spain 7.9
   6 Poland 5.3
   7 Netherlands 4.1
Sweden 2.4
   8 Denmark 1.6
Finland 1.3
Belgium 2.6















Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy are granted a permanent
right to nominate one member of the six-person Executive Board. In accord-
ance with Article 11.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Sys-
tem of Central banks and of the European Central Bank all six members are
to be appointed from among persons of recognised standing and profes-
sional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of
the governments of the member states at the level of the Heads of State or
Government, on a recommendation from the Council after it has consulted
the European Parliament and the Governing Council.
1 Within the six groups membership in the Council rotates.
2 These are determined giving GDP and population equal
weight.
Sources: Eurostat; OECD; World Bank; calculations of
the DIW Berlin. DIW Berlin 2002
which form regionally defined groups, would rotate
annually. In addition, the four countries with by far
the most weight – Germany (20.6%), the United
Kingdom (15.4%), France (14.7%) and Italy (13.1%)
– should be permanently granted the right to nomi-
nate one member of the Executive Board.
Admittedly, this proposal would most likely require a
further amendment of the EU treaty, as both the rota-
tion within groups and the permanent right to nomi-
nate representatives to the Executive Board need to
be laid down in law. However, this should apply to all
proposals that aim to restrict the number of members
entitled to vote in the Governing Council. Hence this
should also apply to the proposal of Baldwin et al.,
who suggest the delegation of decision making to a
group of experts, i.e. the Executive Board.8
The Nice Treaty enables the European Council (in the
composition of the Heads of State or Government) to
change the voting rules laid down in Art. 10.2 of the
Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central banks and of the European Central Bank. In
accordance with Art. 5 of the Nice Treaty, such deci-
sions must be made unanimously and ratified by each
member state; the EU Commission, the ECB and the
European Parliament have to be consulted during the
decision-making process. Making further changes in
the Treaty that have to do with the ECB Council and
Executive Board should thus not prove to be too dif-
ficult. In any case, the decision should be made by
2004, as it will be more difficult to pass a reform lim-
iting voting rights within an enlarged EU.
Real convergence does not imply higher
inflation
It is often argued that enlarging the euro area by ad-
mitting countries still in the catch-up process would
impair the ECB’s policies, because real conver-
gence in the new member states is inevitably con-
nected with higher inflation rates.9 In such circum-
stances, the ECB would only be able to achieve its
target of a maximum inflation rate of 2% for the
euro area as a whole if the more advanced member
states had a correspondingly lower inflation rate.10
This, of course, could substantially hamper their
economic development.
The argument on which such fears are based is re-
lated to the Balassa-Samuelson model11 (cf. Box 1).
This model gives a supply-side explanation for the
differences in the price levels between countries in
different stages of economic development. Accord-
ing to the model, differences in the overall price lev-
el between countries with different levels of devel-
opment stem from the prices of non-traded goods,
especially services. The prices of non-traded goods
differ due to the wage level, which is generally lower
in less developed countries. The overall wage level
of the economy is determined by the productivity in
the traded goods sector,12 in which developing
8 Baldwin et al., op. cit. The Treaty states that the Governing Council is the
decision-making body of the ECB and must be composed of the Executive
Board and the presidents of the national central banks. The Governing
Council can delegate certain decisions in accordance with Art. 12, but it is
not clear whether this includes all monetary policy decisions; moreover, it
would then be equally possible to reverse the delegation.
9 Cf. for example Baldwin et al., op. cit.; H.-W. Sinn and M. Reutter: The Mini-
mum Inflation Rate for Euroland, NBER Working Paper, No. 8085/2001.
10 H.-W. Sinn and M. Reutter, op. cit.
11 B. Balassa: The purchasing power parity doctrine: A reappraisal. In:
Journal of Political Economy, 1964, pp. 584–596; P.A. Samuelson: Theo-
retical notes on trade problems. In: Review of Economics and Statistics,
1964, pp. 147–154.
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Box 1
The Balassa-Samuelson effect
The Balassa-Samuelson model gives a supply-side explanation for changes in the relative price of tradable
and non-tradable goods. Assuming perfect competition in the tradable goods sector and in the factor mar-
kets, the relative price between non-traded and traded goods is entirely determined by the production func-
tions. The Balassa-Samuelson effect states that changes in the relative prices between traded and non-
traded goods are a consequence of different productivity advances in the two sectors. As long as PPP holds
for the traded goods prices, an increase in productivity in this sector will not influence their price. Instead, in
the case of fixed exchange rates or a monetary union, nominal wages will rise. If wages develop similarly in
the whole economy, non-traded goods’ prices will increase and therefore become relatively more expensive.
The Balassa-Samuelson effect can be described within the framework of a model of a small open economy.1
The following assumptions are made:
1. The economy produces traded and non-traded goods.
2. The supply side can be approximated by two (different) production functions, in which capital and labour
are used as inputs and which are characterised by constant returns to scale.
3. Purchasing power parity holds for the traded goods; their prices are therefore given exogenously.
4. Capital markets are integrated; and the interest rate is thus determined in the world markets.
5. Capital stock is fixed in the short run.
6. The labour market is homogenous within the economy. Wages in the traded goods sector are determined
by the marginal product, and these wages hold also for the non-traded goods sector.
Capital stock, the prices of traded goods and the interest rate are thus exogenous. In addition, for the non-
traded goods sector, wages are given. In such a setting, the relative price of non-traded goods is uniquely
determined by the first-order conditions for firms, i.e. the supply side of the economy. Hence, the trend
increase in the relative price of non-tradables can be viewed as an microeconomic equilibrium phenomenon.
Within this framework, an increase in the traded goods sector’s productivity that exceeds that in the non-
traded goods sector will – assuming unchanged interest rates – raise the capital labour ratio in the traded
goods sector and also nominal wages. To ensure that the returns on capital equal the given interest rate, the
higher wages will require an adjustment in the capital-labour ratio also in the non-traded goods sector. This,
however, implies that the amount of labour used in the production of non-traded goods declines. While the
relative price of the non-traded goods increases, their output decreases. This is a consequence of the fact
that the production function and the capital stock remain unchanged, while the labour input declines.
The relationship between the increase in the relative price of non-traded goods and productivity growth can
be derived as follows. Taking logarithms of and totally differentiating the first-order conditions leads to:
[1] 0 = ∆ at – b ∆ (kt – lt)
[2] 0 = ∆ (pnt – pt) + ∆ ant – c ∆ (knt – lnt)
[3] ∆ w = ∆ at + (1 – b ) ∆ (kt – lt)
[4] ∆ w = ∆ (pnt – pt) + ∆ ant + (1 – c) ∆ (knt – lnt),
where ∆ denotes the total differentials of the respective logarithm and (pnt – pt) the relative price of non-
traded goods. Rearranging equations 1 to 4 leads to the following relationship2:
[5] ∆ (pnt – pt) = c/b ∆ at – ∆ ant .
1 Cf. M. Obstfeld and K. Rogoff: Foundations of International Macroeco-
nomics, Cambridge/Mass., London 1995.
2 L. Sarno and M.P. Taylor: Purchasing Power Parity and the Real Exchange
Rate. CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 2913/ 2001.
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countries substantially lag behind the advanced
countries (e.g. due to lower capital stock), and thus
entails correspondingly lower wages. Key assump-
tions of this relationship are that the prevailing wage
level in the traded goods sector holds for the entire
economy, and that the production of non-traded
goods essentially relies on labour.
The Balassa-Samuelson model describes a possible
path of convergence in the price level as developing
economies catch up with those that are more devel-
oped. Higher labour productivity in the traded
goods sector will raise the wage level in the whole
economy. Due to the model’s assumption that the
production elasticity of labour is higher in the non-
traded goods sector than in the traded goods sector,
labour productivity increases in the former will be
smaller. The rising wage level will therefore lead to
higher prices for non-traded goods and a rising price
level. However, as the Balassa-Samuelson model
only focuses on one aspect of price level conver-
gence, its applicability for accession countries in the
catch-up process is limited.
First, this applies to the assumption that the law of
one price holds for tradables. Experiences with a
single market both in Europe and in the United
States show that the differences between the prices
for non-traded goods are generally larger than those
for traded goods, but that the latter prices also
diverge substantially.13 These divergences can be
caused by the tax system, by differing competitive
pressures, or by the pricing to market strategies of
enterprises. Wage policies are also of crucial impor-
tance. If wage increases are not determined by mar-
ginal productivity at the firm level, but by central-
ised or cross-firm bargaining processes, the wage
rise will most probably be influenced by average
productivity growth for all the firms or for the econ-
omy as a whole. In such a case, the increase in the
price of non-traded goods will be accordingly lower.
Second, even within the model, the impact of pro-
ductivity increases on the relative price of non-
tradables can differ between countries.14
Third, it is misleading to assume that countries in
the catch-up process produce the same tradable goods
as developed countries with the only difference be-
ing the respective productivities with which they are
produced. Real growth also consists of an increase
and change in the supply capacity (e.g. through a
higher capital stock), which enables countries to
produce an increased variety of traded (and non-
traded) goods. The new goods are usually of a higher
quality and have a higher technological content.
Tradable goods of a higher quality command higher
prices, without leading to a loss of purchasing power.
Fourth, the composition of non-traded goods also
changes during the real convergence process. On
the one hand, this refers to the public infrastructure
and the quality of public goods (e.g. health care or
education); on the other hand, numerous services
are supplied and consumed only after a certain stage
of development has been reached.15 The new ser-
vices in particular – e.g. in telecommunications or
financial intermediation – exhibit above-average
productivity growth.
Fifth, rising real income changes demand patterns.
This is reflected most prominently in the calculation
of the consumer price index. The representative con-
sumer baskets differ substantially between poorer
However, the Balassa-Samuelson model establishes a relationship in levels. A testable relationship in levels
can be derived from the first-order conditions determining labour demand. Equating the conditions relating
factor costs (wages) to the marginal products leads to the following relationship between the marginal prod-
ucts and the relative prices:
Pnt                ∂Yt/∂ Lt [6]          =  ƒ (                   ).
Pt                 ∂Ynt/∂ Lnt
Productivity increases in the traded goods sector that exceed those in the non-traded goods sector will hence
lead to a relative increase in the price of non-traded goods.
Hence, the development of the relative price of non-tradables depends on the productivity growth in the two
sectors. The coefficient of total factor productivity in the traded goods sector should be higher than 1,
because production elasticity of labour in the non-traded goods sector is assumed to exceed that in the
traded goods sector.
12 It is assumed that productivity growth varies less in the non-traded
goods sector.
13 S.G. Cecchetti, N.C. Mark and R.J. Sonora: Price Level Convergence
among United States Cities, Lessons for the European Central Bank, NBER
Working Paper, No. 7681/2000; J.H. Rogers: Price Level Convergence,
Relative Prices, and Inflation in Europe, International Finance, Discussion
Paper (FedBoard), No. 699/2001.
14 As a consequence of different production elasticities between the
countries, cf. Equation 5 in Box 1.
15 J.N. Bhagwati: Splintering and disembodiment of services and devel-
oping nations. In: World Economy, 7/1984, pp. 133–143.
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Box 2
Empirical investigation of the Balassa-Samuelson effect for five candidates countries
For five candidate countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) we empirically tested
for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. As this effect assumes a relationship between trending variables, we tested
for cointegration. The estimated relationship is that in Equation 6 in Box 1.
Cointegration was tested for with Engle-Granger single equation tests.1 That is a rather restrictive method,
as possible short-term dynamics cannot be accounted for. However, the small sample and the choice of quar-
terly data (the number of included observations ranges between 26 and 30) make the use of VAR based
methods difficult. In the estimations, we included level shift dummies when structural change made this nec-
essary.
The inclusion of level shift dummies in the estimation equation
yt = a + m dt (λ) + b’ xt + εt
requires that they are also included in the ADF test of the residuals:
∆εt = α*εt–1 + α0*∆ dt (λ) + ut
and that the critical values are modified. We used the findings of Hassler2 that the values determined by
MacKinnon can still be applied, if every dummy variable is treated as an additional non-stationary regressor.
Only in the case of Estonia, could we use the productivity differential between the traded and non-traded
goods sector, as only for this country consistent national accounts according to the A6 classification of the
ESA95 are available. Productivity advances in the traded goods sector are approximated by productivity in-
creases in industry, while the sectors construction, trade and finance represent the non-traded goods sector.
Price developments are reflected in the corresponding deflators.
For the other countries, no quarterly time series on productivity developments in the non-traded goods sec-
tor were available. We therefore had to assume that productivity has not grown in the non-traded goods
sector, which is a very restrictive assumption. This implies that the determined parameters overstate the
actual effect. Productivity increases in the traded goods sector were approximated by productivity in indus-
try. Prices of non-tradable goods are represented by the service prices included in the consumer price index
(CPI), and those of traded goods by the producer price index.
We could find a systematic relationship between relative productivity and relative prices for some countries
only:
Country Constant Productivity differential Dummies
1 ADF test of residuals
2,
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (coefficient; t-statistic) t-statistic
Estonia
(1994/1 – 2001/3) 0.07 (2.23) 1.02 (4.91) ID943 (0.23;  3.1) –4.49**
SD951 (0.42; 12.74)
SD983 (0.16;  5.28)
Poland
(1995/1 – 2001/2) –0.61 (–42.45) 0.34 (8.72) SD981 (0.07; 4.79) –3.04
Slovenia
(1994/1 – 2001/2) 0.05 (4.62) 0.78(20.36) SD001 (–0.04; –2.69) –4.30**
Czech Republic
(1994/1 – 2001/2) –0.002 (–0.25) 0.37 (7.02) SD973 (0.11; 8.61) –2.26
SD984 (0.05; 4.03)
Hungary
(1995/1 – 2001/2) 0.006 (0.29) 0.28 (7.83) –4.06**
1 ID: impulsdummy; SD: step dummy; SD 981 denotes 2 ** denotes significance at at 5% level.
 step dummy starting in the first quarter of 1998.
Sources: Eurostat; OECD; calculation of the DIW Berlin.
1 R.F. Engle and C.W.J. Granger: Co-integration and error-correction: represen-
tation, estimation and testing. In: Econometrica, No. 55/1987, pp. 251–276.
2 U. Hassler: (Co-)integration testing under structural breaks – A survey with
special emphasis on the German unification. In: R. Pohl and H. P. Galler (eds.):
Implikationen der Währungsunion für makroökonometrische Modelle, Baden-
Baden, 2001.
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and richer countries. While food has a larger weight
in the former, services are relatively more important
in the latter. However, not only the weights of the
goods included change during the growth process:
new goods enter the basket, while others are re-
moved. For example, when the Irish Statistical
Office altered its representative basket in 2002, they
eliminated TV rental and added the purchase of
DVD players.
These five factors mean that price level conver-
gence during the catch-up process can only partly
be viewed as inflation. Furthermore, precisely these
factors result in growth in the countries in the catch-
up process being higher when measured with pur-
chasing power parities instead of at constant prices.
However, this does not preclude the prices of some
services rising due to higher wage levels connected
with higher productivity in the traded goods sector.
Examples of such services are provided by the much
cited hairdresser, but also by taxis or home nursing.
We examined the Balassa-Samuelson effect for five
candidate countries (cf. Box 2). Figures 1 and 2
show the development of the relative price of non-
tradables and productivity growth. All countries are
characterised by a trend of increasing relative prices
for non-traded goods. But productivity advances
differ markedly between the countries examined.
The Estonian series moreover indicates that the dif-
ference between the productivity increases in the
traded and non-traded goods sectors can be rather
small. In addition, the effect of productivity increases
on increases in the relative price of non-tradables
differs greatly between the countries examined. The
estimated coefficients are small in countries with
large productivity increases and high in those with
rather low productivity developments. We conclude
that other factors will have at least an equal influ-
ence on the determination of the relative price of
non-traded goods. Most importantly, in all the can-
didate countries the prices of some basic utilities
(such as housing, water and energy) are still regu-
lated. As their liberalisation must be completed be-
fore accession to the EU, adjustments are frequent
and considerable. From Figures 1 and 2 it can be
Figure 1
Productivity and price differential
1
in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia
1 Difference between the change in productivity
and the change in prices of traded and non-traded
goods.
Sources: OECD; calculations of the DIW Berlin. DIW Berlin 2002



















Critical values for the ADF test of the residuals3:
3 J.G. MacKinnon: Critical values for cointegration tests. In: R.F. Engle
and C.W.J. Granger (eds.): Long-run Economic Relationships: Reading in
Cointegration. Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 267–276.
Number of stochastic variables
12345
1% –3.90 –4.30 –4.65 –4.96 –5.24
5% –3.34 –3.74 –4.10 –4.42 –4.70
seen that the price differential series are character-
ised by a number of level shifts. As most of the regu-
lated prices are services, it comes as no surprise that
the relative price of non-tradables shows a trend in-
crease; this however is independent of the produc-
tivity trends in the traded goods sector.
This assessment of the Balassa-Samuelson effect on
overall inflation is confirmed by work e.g. by econ-
omists at the ECB.16 According to their investiga-
tion, the most important factors determining the
16 O. Arratibel, D. Rodriguez-Palanzuaela and Ch. Thimann: Inflation
Dynamics and Dual Inflation in Accession Countries: A “New Keynesian”
Perspective ECB Working Paper, No. 132/2002.
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prices of non-traded goods are wage increases and
factors related to the transition process, such as the
liberalisation of regulated prices. Another piece of
evidence is added by a panel investigation of the
Balassa-Samuelson effect in the accession countries,
which explicitly takes into account the weight of the
traded and non-traded goods in the consumer basket
Table 3
The impact on the overall HICP of inflation in
the candidate countries
Effect of an inflation
Weight in the HICP differential of 1.5 per-
of an enlarged centage points in the
euro area in % candidate countries
(base year = 2000) on the total HICP,
in  percentage points











Sources: Eurostat; calculations of
the  DIW Berlin. DIW Berlin 2002
on the one hand, and productivity increases in Ger-
many on the other. Even in the countries with the
highest productivity increases in the traded goods
sector – Hungary and Poland – the inflation differen-
tial caused by higher productivity growth in the trad-
ed goods sector amounts to just about 1.5 percentage
points.17 As the estimations were made assuming no
productivity advances in the non-traded goods sec-
tor, and as regulated prices are included in the non-
traded goods prices, this should mark the upper limit
of potential inflation differences due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. Given the weight of Poland in an
enlarged euro area’s HICP of 2.8% (cf. Table 3), the
Balassa-Samuelson effect would cause an increase in
the overall inflation rate of 0.04 percentage points. In
the case of Hungary, a smaller country, the increase
would be 0.01 percentage points.
Conclusion
The EU could be enlarged by up to ten countries by
2004. A corresponding enlargement of the euro area
is likely to follow with a delay of just a few years.
An early change in the ECB’s voting rules is
urgently needed in order to prevent the decision-
making process from becoming too cumbersome.
Our proposal, i.e. forming groups within which
membership in the Governing Council rotates, would
lead to a manageable size of the decision-making
body, without compromising the close ties with in-
dividual regions. Furthermore, the accountability of
the ECB to member states and thus support for the
ECB would be retained.
An impairment of monetary policy as a result of en-
larging the euro area to include countries in the
catch-up process need not be feared. The impor-
tance of the Balassa-Samuelson effect during the
price level convergence is limited, and the weight
of the accession countries in the overall HICP will be
rather small. Therefore, it is highly likely that price
developments in the new member countries will
have only a negligible impact on the euro area’s ag-
gregate inflation rate. At the same time, the limited
importance of structural inflation in the accession
countries indicates that inflation can be swiftly re-
duced, if the market participants expect such a de-
cline and adjust their behaviour accordingly. The
accession countries would thus gain from early par-
ticipation in the ERM II – the preliminary stage for
adopting the euro – and an early announcement of
the target date for meeting the Maastricht criteria.
The more expectations can be positively influenced,
the less the real costs of the disinflation process will
be.
Figure 2
Productivity and price differential
1
in Poland and the Czech Republic
1 Difference between the change in productivity
and the change in prices of traded and non-traded
goods.
Sources: OECD; calculations of the DIW Berlin. DIW Berlin 2002
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Productivity differential Czech Republic














17 B. Egert: Investigating the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis in the Tran-
sition: A Panel Study, Economics of Transition 2/2002.
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